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CRAWFORD v. GOULD: FEDERAL STATUTE 




In Crawford v. Gould, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
State of California may not take Social Security benefits from 
a recipient without his or her consent. 1 The court found that 
federal law preempted California's procedure of applying the 
Social Security benefits of unconsenting institutionalized pa-
tients to the cost of their care.2 With this decision, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled California's procedure invalid.3 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
California law holds patients committed to state psychiat-
ric hospitals liable for the cost of their "care, support, and 
maintenance."4 Upon commitment to a California hospital, 
each patient receives a statement of pending liability for the 
cost of services provided by the state.5 The state then conducts 
individual financial investigations to determine how much each 
patient can afford to pay for care costs.6 Hospitals use this in-
1. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1995) (per Tang, J., joined 
by Schroeder, J., Trott, J.; per Trott, J., concurring). 
2. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1163. 
3. [d. at 1166. 
4. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7275 (West 1981). 
5. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1995). 
6. [d. at 1164. The Client Financial Services branch of the California Depart-
91 
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formation to establish a monthly billing procedure for each 
patient.7 
California law also requires that each state psychiatric 
hospital establish and maintain trust accounts in which it 
must place all funds patients have at admission and any they 
receive while institutionalized.s These funds include federal 
Social Security Survivors and Disability Insurance benefits.9 
When assets in an individual patient's fund exceed $500, the 
hospital draws a payment to cover the costs of that patient's 
care. lO This process begins shortly after admission, when each 
patient is asked to sign an authorization form allowing the 
hospital to deposit into, and withdraw from, the trust ac-: 
count. ll Regardless of whether a patient signs the authoriza-
ment of Developmental Services makes this determination. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7281 (West 1981). These funds are known as 
"Patients' Personal Deposit Fund[sl." Id. 
9. Crawford; 56 F.3d at 1164. 
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7281 (West 1981). 
11. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1164. The "Authorization for Deposit and Withdraw-
al" provides in part: 
Id. 
I understand that State law requires the deposit 
into my Personal Deposit Fund of all moneys in my pos-
session at the time of my admission to a state hospi-
tal . . . and any other funds received by or for me during 
my residence at such a state facility. These funds so 
deposited may have originated from any private or public 
source, including such federal agencies as the Social Secu-
rity Administration and/or the Veterans Administration. 
[Dlisbursements from my Personal Deposit Fund 
may be made by the Trust Officer on my behalf for my 
care and maintenance, treatment services, clothing, per-
sonal purchases and other necessities and incidentals. 
I hereby authorize all such deposits to and with-
drawals from my Personal Deposit Fund. 
I further understand that federal laws dealing with 
Social Security or Veterans Administration payments ex-
empt these benefits from legal or equitable claim process-
es so they will be available for the purpose of assuring 
my care, maintenance and medical treatment. This Autho-
rization for the use of these benefits is specifically for 
these stated purposes. 
2
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tion, the hospital deposits and withdraws funds from the 
patient's account. 12 
Several of the named plaintiffs in Crawford v. Gould re-
fused to give, or revoked, their authorizations to California's 
deduction process. 13 Nonetheless, the state deducted care 
costs from these patients' funds. 14 These patients then filed a 
class action suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin the 
Secretary of the California Health and Welfare Agency from 
taking funds from class members' trust accounts. 15 On cross 
motions for summary judgment, the district court granted 
partial relief to the plaintiffs.16 The court enjoined California 
from withdrawing patients' Social Security benefits without 
patient consent, and concluded that federal law preempts this 
practice. 17 
12. [d. "Each hospital provides nonconsenting patients with a 'Notice of Intend-
ed Withdrawal,' which informs the patient of the amount the hospital will be 
withdrawing monthly from the patient's trust account." [d. 
13. [d. at 1164. Of the six named plaintiffs, at least five refused to sign or 
revoked authorization. The court failed to provide this information about the sixth 
named plaintiffs actions. [d. 
14. See id. 
15. [d. at 1163-65. The class was defined as follows: 
All current and future patients involuntarily hospi-
talized in a California state psychiatric hospital who re-
ceive funds at the hospital which are deposited in the 
patient's personal deposit fund at the hospital, and for 
whom funds on deposit have been or are subject to being 
applied as payments toward the costs of the patient's care 
and treatment at the hospital. 
All members of the class who receive Social Secu-
rity benefits for whom the State is not the representative 
payee are members of a sub-class, which is defined as 
follows: 
All current and future patients involuntarily hospi-
talized in a California state psychiatric hospital who re-
ceive Social Security benefits which are deposited in the 
patient's personal deposit fund, for whom these funds 
have been or are subject to being applied as payments 
towards the costs of the patient's care and treatment at 
the hospital. 
[d. Although the district court opinion has not been published, this class is defined 
in Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1163 n.l. 
16. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165. 
17. [d. The district court based its preemption determination on 42 U.S.C. § 
407(a) (1994). [d. See infra note 28 and accompanying text for statutory language. 
3
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The district court also held that the notice California pro-
vided before withdrawing any funds from patients' accounts 
was inadequate and violated procedural due process require-
ments. 18 The court enjoined California from withdrawing 
funds without adequate notice and ordered the state to change 
its notice procedure.19 The State then appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit.20 
III. BACKGROUND 
A cursory knowledge of Social Security benefits is integral 
to understanding the application of Social Security 
nonassignment law in Crawford.21 This section traces the 
development of Social Security nonassignment law, defines 
Social Security and explains how the Social Security Act's 
nonassignment statute affects this area of law.22 
A. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
Social Security is a program of federal payments designed 
to provide some protection to workers and their families 
against loss of earnings due to retirement, disability, or 
death.23 The Social Security statute defines "disability" as an 
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity because 
[d. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. The district court ordered California to inform patients: 
a) of the proposed share of cost and the facts on 
which the determination was made; 
b) that the plaintiff has a right to appeal the share 
of cost determination; 
c) a description of the appeal process and proce-
dure; and 
d) that certain federal benefits, specifically Social 
Security benefits and Veterans benefits, are exempt from 
legal process and cannot be used to pay the plaintiff's 
cost of care without the patient's knowing, affirmative and 
unequivocal consent. 
20. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165. 
21. See Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1161, 1165-67 (9th Cir. 1995). See also 42 
U.S.C. §§ 301-1397, for statutory law controlling Social Security benefits. 
22. See infra notes 23-75 and accompanying text. 
23. ARTHUR ABRAHAM AND DAVID L. KOPELMAN, FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY 4 
(1979); See also 42 U.S.C. § 423 (West Supp. 1995). 
4
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of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 
that will last at least twelve months, or until death.24 This 
definition qualifies a wide variety of people with assorted dis-
abilities to receive Social Security benefits.25 A subclass of the 
plaintiffs in Crawford had qualified under this definition, and 
were eligible to receive Social Security benefits.26 
B. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT'S N ONASSIGNMENT PROVISION 
1. Introduction 
In 1935, Congress passed the Social Security Act's 
Nonassignment Provision (hereinafter "SSANP,,).27 In relevant 
part, this section provides that "[t]he right of any person to 
future payment [of Social Security funds is not] transferable or 
assignable [or] subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnish-
ment, or other legal process.,,28 
The SSANP generally protects Social Security recipients' 
benefits from unconsented attachment by a state governmental 
entity.29 The Supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
24. Id. 
25. See, e.g., Irwin v. Shalala, 840 F. Supp. 751, 761-70 (D. Or. 1993) (chronic 
fatigue syndrome); Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 955-59 (9th Cir. 1993) (back 
pain); Donahue v. Shalala, 851 F. Supp. 27, 29-34 (D. Conn. 1994) (post-traumatic 
stress disorder); Holden v. Shalala, 846 F. Supp. 662, 664-70 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (obe-
sity). 
26. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1163 n.!. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1994) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 14, 1935, c. 
531, Title II, § 207, 49 Stat. 624). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (a). In whole, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) provides: 
The right of any person to any future payment 
under this title shall not be transferable or assignable, at 
law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable 
or rights existing under this title shall be subject to exe-
cution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal pro-
cess, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency 
law. 
42 U.S.C. § 407(a). 
29. See King v. Schafer, 940 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1991) (state may not 
threaten to sue for Social Security benefits to pay for patient recipient's care) cert. 
denied 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Kreigbaum v. Katz, 909 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1990) 
(holding that special proceeding provided for by state law was unconstitutional as 
"legal process" to obtain Social Security benefits as payment for institutional care); 
Fetterusso v. New York, 898 F.2d 322, 328 (2nd Cir. 1990) (holding that § 407(a) 
is violated if state places itself in position as preferred creditor or coerces payment 
5
Webb: Social Security Benefits
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
96 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:91 
tion mandates that federal law prevails over any conflicting 
state law.30 Therefore, when a state has a statute or proce-
dure allowing it to take a recipient's benefits without his or 
her consent, as California's procedure did with state psychi-
atric patients, the SSANP will control, and the recipient's 
benefits may not be taken.31 
The state attachment will be prohibited unless a jurisdic-
tion finds there is an implied exception to the SSANP's lan-
guage.32 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal 
have ruled that an implied exception to the SSANP's language 
exists.33 These courts held that, under certain circumstances, 
a recipient's benefits may be taken without his or her con-
sent.34 
2. Overview of Nonassignment Case Law 
A number of courts interpreted and applied the SSANP 
before it became an issue in Crawford.35 A summary of some 
of Social Security benefits); Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263, 265-66 (9th Cir. 
1989) (per curiam) (holding that state reimbursement procedures conflicted with § 
407(a) and must be struck down); Woodall v. Bartolino, 700 F. Supp. 210, 220 
(D.N.J. 1985) (holding that state or its courts cannot compel a Social Security 
beneficiary's payee to use funds for recipient care costs, but should try to seek 
remedy from Social Security District Office under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2041, 404.2050, 
416.601(a)(20». 
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI. See also Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397 
(1988) (holding that Arkansas statute was in conflict with § 407; "a conflict that 
the State cannot win."). 
31. See supra note 29. 
32. See e.g. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 1192 (11th 
Cir. 1991). See also infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text. 
33. See id.. See also Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 
616 F.2d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 1980). See also infra notes 54-75 and accompanying 
text. 
34. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. See also infra notes 67-75 and accompa-
nying text. 
35. See, e.g., Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988) (per curiam) (the U.S. 
Supreme Court reviewing Arkansas statute that sought recipient prisoners' Social 
Security funds to defray costs of incarceration); Philpott v. Essex County Welfare 
Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973) (the U.S. Supreme Court reviewing New Jersey procedure 
of seeking reimbursement after recipient received state assistance on condition that 
he would reimburse state agency); King v. Schafer, 940 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(appellate court reviewing Missouri's forcing of insanity acquittees' payees to use 
Social Security benefits for cost of patients' care) cert. denied 502 U.S. 1095 (1991); 
Kreigbaum v. Katz, 909 F.2d 70 (2nd Cir. 1991) (appellate court reviewing state of 
6
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of these courts' rulings using the SSANP, illustrating the cur-
rent state of SSANP law, follows. 
The United States Supreme Court first addressed a state's 
access to a recipient's benefits in 1973, in Philpott v. Essex 
County Welfare Board.36 Philpott involved a New Jersey law 
requiring state old-age assistance applicants to agree to reim-
burse the State for any disability advances they receive. 37 
This statute enabled the state welfare board to obtain reim-
bursement from the recipient's subsequently discovered or 
acquired property.38 When the recipient in Philpott was ap-
proved to receive Social Security benefits, the State attached 
the beneficiary's bank account to recoup state funds previously 
disbursed.39 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a state could not sue a 
beneficiary for Social Security funds despite the beneficiary's 
reimbursement agreement.40 The Supreme Court reasoned 
that the language of the SSANP "on its face" prohibits the 
state from reaching the Social Security payments made to the 
beneficiary by barring any "legal process.,,41 The Court found 
New York's attempt to use insanity acquittees' Social Security benefits to defray 
costs of institutional care); Fetterusso v. New York, 898 F.2d 322 (2nd Cir. 1990) 
(appellate court reviewing procedure in which state acts as representative payee 
for insanity acquittees in order to secure reimbursement of patients' costs for 
care). 
36. Philpott v. Essex Co. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973). 
37. [d. at 414 n.2. The New Jersey statute provided: 
Every county welfare board shall require, as a 
condition to granting assistance in any case, that all or 
any part of the property, either real or personal, of a 
person applying for old age assistance, be pledged to said 
county welfare board as a guaranty for the reimbursement 
of the funds so granted as old age assistance pursuant to 
the provisions of this chapter. The county welfare board 
shall take from each applicant a properly acknowledged 
agreement to reimburse for all advances granted, and 
pursuant to such agreement, said applicant shall assign to 
the welfare board, as collateral security for such advances, 
all or any part of his personal property as the board shall 
specify. 
N.J. STAT ANN. § 44:7-14(a) (West Supp. 1972-73). 
38. Philpott, 409 U.S. at 414-15. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. at 415-16. 
41. [d. at 415. 
7
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that the suit brought by the state to take Philpott's Social 
Security benefits was "legal process" as defined by the SSANP, 
and as such, was prohibited by the SSANp.'2 
Fifteen years later, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the 
issue in Bennett v. Arkansas.43 The Supreme Court found a 
"clear inconsistency" between the SSANP and an Arkansas 
statute authorizing the state to seize prisoners' Social Security 
benefits to pay for the cost of incarceration.44 The Arkansas 
Supreme Court previously had upheld the statute, finding an 
implied exception to the SSANP's exemption from legal process 
when a state provides for the care and maintenance of a Social 
Security beneficiary.45 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, holding that it was "the clear intent of Congress 
that Social Security benefits not be attachable."46 The U.S. 
Supreme Court concluded that, in view of this "inconsistency," 
the Supremacy Clause required that the state statute be over-
ruled.47 
Since Bennett, the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided 
another case based on the SSANP. 48 As a result, the rule of 
the SSANP, as defined in Bennett and Philpott, is that a 
recipient's benefits may not be taken without his or her con-
sent.49 However, this does not mean that this area of law has 
been completely defined.50 Both the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have found that an implied exception to the SSANP's 
nonassignment language exists. 51 
42. ld. at 416. 
43. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988). 
44. ld. at 397. See also State Prison Inmate Care and Custody Reimbursement 
Act. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-1701 (West Supp. 1985) This statute was found uncon-
stitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1988. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397. 
45. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397. 
46. ld. at 398. 
47. ld. at 397 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.). 
48. See 94 SHEPARD'S!MCGRAw-HILL, INC., SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS 
AND COURT RULES No. 13 (Semiannual Cum. SUpp. 1995) and 94 
SHEPARD'S!MCGRAw-HILL, INC., SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS AND COURT 
RULES-PART 2 No. 21 (Cum. Supp. 1995). 
49. See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 415, and Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397-98. See also 
supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
50. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text. 
51. See Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 616 F.2d 
828, 832 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding implied exception to SSANP) and Citronelle-Mo-
8
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3. The Implied Exception Approach 
An implied exception is an exclusion that is unexpressed 
but understood by implication or necessary deduction from the 
circumstances.52 Courts that have found an implied exception 
to the SSANP's language hold that in certain circumstances 
the SSANP does not prohibit the unconsented taking of a 
recipient's benefits.53 This subsection will discuss the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits' use of an implied exception approach to 
the SSANP. 
a. The Fifth Circuit 
In 1980, after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Philpott, 
but before the Bennett decision, the Fifth Circuit used an im-
plied exception approach in Department of Health & Rehabili-
tative Services v. Davis. 54 The case involved the State of Flori-
da seeking reimbursement from an adjudicated incompetent 
bile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
there is implied exception to SSANP). After the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973) the Fifth Circuit, in 
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828, 830-32 
(5th Cir. 1980), held that under certain circumstances a state could take a 
recipient's Social Security benefits without his or her consent. Eight years later 
the Supreme Court decided Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988). Since 
Bennett, the Fifth Circuit has not decided another case based on 42 U.S.C. § 
407(a). Thus, it is unclear whether the Fifth Circuit will use a different "implied 
exception" approach than used in Davis, or whether the Bennett case will end such 
use in future Fifth Circuit cases that deal with 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). However, it is 
clear that the Eleventh Circuit still follows such an "implied exception" approach. 
The Eleventh Circuit followed such an approach when it decided Citronelle-Mobile 
Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180 (11th Cir. 1991), three years after the deci-
sion in Bennett. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text for more information 
regarding Davis and Watkins. 
52. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, M.A., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 679 (5th ed. 
1979) (implied: The word is used in law in contrast to "express"; i.e., where the 
intention in regard to the subject-matter is not manifested by explicit and direct 
words, but is gathered by implication or necessary deduction from the circumstanc-
es, the general language, or the conduct of the parties.). 
53. See, e.g., Department of Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828, 
830-32 (5th Cir. 1980) and Citronelle-Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 
1192 (11th Cir. 1991). 
54. 616 F.2d 828, 830-32 (5th Cir. 1980). 
9
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for whom the state had cared for over four years.55 The state 
expended approximately $12,000 to care for the defendant 
while the defendant's guardian had accumulated over $40,000 
on his behalf in Social Security and Veterans' benefits. 56 The 
district court hearing the case found that the SSANP barred 
the state from taking the recipient's funds. 57 The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed. 58 
The Fifth Circuit created an implied exception to the 
SSANP, reasoning that the SSANP does not serve its intended 
purpose when a beneficiary has sufficient funds for his or her 
support.59 In distinguishing Davis from Philpott, the court 
noted that in Davis the state provided for all of the recipient's 
needs, while in Philpott the state provided for only part of a 
recipient's needs.60 The Davis court then held that the State 
could take Social Security benefits as reimbursement for care 
costs provided to a beneficiary as long as the State is providing 
for all of his or her needs.61 
However, the Davis case's precedential value is question-
able in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Bennett, 
eight years after Davis.62 The Supreme Court discredited the 
Fifth Circuit's approach in Davis of distinguishing itself on 
factual grounds from the precedent of Philpott.63 The Supreme 
Court referred to the Davis reasoning and stated that it did 
not "think such a distinction carries the day given the express 
language of [the SSANP].,,64 By this statement, the Supreme 
Court clearly disapproved of the Fifth Circuit's implied excep-
tion approach.65 Thus, according to Bennett, an implied excep-
tion approach to the SSANP may not be based on the fact that 




59. Davis, 616 F.2d at 830-32. 
60. Id. at 830. 
61. Id. 830-32. 
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the party seeking the beneficiary's funds provides for all of the 
beneficiary's needs.66 
b. The Eleventh Circuit 
In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit declared that it had "implied 
an exception to [the SSANP] when the reaching of Social Secu-
rity benefits is not going to impair the ability of the recipient 
to satisfy his or her basic needs." 67The case, Citronelle-Mobile 
Gathering v. Watkins, involved a judgment debtor who had sole 
control of corporate assets totaling over $10,000,000.68 This 
debtor argued that his $2,826 in Social Security funds, which 
was deposited into an account with tens of thousands of other 
dollars, was protected by the SSANP from garnishment.69 
The Eleventh Circuit applied the implied exception ap-
proach to these facts and held that the SSANP did not prevent 
garnishment of the recipient's benefits.70 The court found that 
the amount of Social Security funds as compared to the 
appellant's total assets meant that the garnishment of these 
benefits would "not mean the difference between desperation 
and subsistence."7l The garnishment of these funds would not 
impair the appellant's ability to satisfy his basic needs, and 
therefore they could be taken without his consent.72 
In creating its implied exception, the Eleventh Circuit 
relied on its previous definition of the purpose of the SSANP 
as "insur[ing] that recipients have the resources necessary to 
meet their most basic needs."73 The Watkins court also cited 
the Fifth Circuit's approach in Davis for support, which was to 
66. Id. at 397-98. 
67. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir. 
1991). See also United States v. Devall, 704 F.2d 1513, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1983) 






72. Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. 
73. Id. (citing Devall, 704 F.2d at 1516-17). 
11
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distinguish Philpott on factual grounds.74 Additionally, 
Watkins relied on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Davis, noting 
that neither the purpose of Social Security benefits nor the 
purpose of the SSANP is accomplished by protecting a 
recipient's benefits when they are not needed for his or her 
care and maintenance.75 
In sum, the general rule of the SSANP, as stated in the 
statute itself and by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bennett, is 
that it unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social 
Security benefits.76 The Fifth Circuit's implied exception ap-
proach is no longer valid since the Supreme Court has discred-
ited the Davis court's reasoning supporting an implied excep-
tion when a state provides for all of a recipient's needs.77 
However, Davis retains some importance since the Eleventh 
Circuit adopted its reasoning that a strict application of the 
SSANP does not always serve the intended purposes of Social 
Security benefits or the SSANP itself.78 The Eleventh Circuit's 
implied exception approach may be distinguished from the 
defunct Fifth Circuit's because it is based on whether the re-
cipient has sufficient funds for care, and not on whether the 
state has provided for all of the recipient's needs.79 
74. [d. In Watkins, the appellant cited four cases to support his claim that § 
407 bars the state from reaching his Social Security funds. [d. The court distin-
guished these cases: Harris v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 614, 615 (4th Cir. 1982) (Social 
Security as only income for widow); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 51 (3d Cir. 
1980) (68 year old widow's sole source of income from Social Security); Tidwell v. 
Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1982) (institutionalized mental patients 
Social Security benefits automatically paid to the state); and Philpott v. Essex 
County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973) (state seeking reimbursement from Social 
Security recipient who had no other income), on the factual basis that these cases 
dealt with recipients who needed the funds, and the present case in which recipi-
ent had enough funds to keep him from "desperation and subsistence." Thus, such 
a factual finding becomes very important in cases based on § 407 in the Eleventh 
Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit did not mention the holding of Bennett in its analy-
sis of the issue. The Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the Davis approach of distin-
guishing Philpott on factual grounds may have been due to the appellant's failure 
to cite Bennett in his brief. Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1191-92. 
75. [d. at 1192. 
76. See Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397 (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
407(a). 
77. See Bennett, 485 U.S. at 398; see also Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828, 830-32 (5th Cir. 1980). 
78. See Citronelle-Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir. 
1991). 
79. Id.; Compare Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192 (exception applies when "the 
12
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Crawford v. Gould,80 the Ninth Circuit addressed 
whether California's procedure for taking Social Security funds 
from institutionalized patients was inconsistent with the 
SSANP.81 The Ninth Circuit held that Social Security benefits 
are exempt from any legal process.82 The court then concluded 
that California's procedure was "other legal process" as defined 
by the SSANP, and found that the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution required the invalidation of the state proce-
dure due to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bennett.83 
A. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
The Ninth Circuit primarily reviewed whether the process 
California used to deduct Social Security benefits from certain 
patients' hospital accounts conflicted with the SSANP.84 If the 
court found such a conflict, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution would require the invalidation of the California 
procedure.85 
The Crawford court's analysis focused on two cases.86 In 
Bennett v. Arkansas, the U.S. Supreme Court held an Arkan-
sas statute invalid under the Supremacy Clause because it 
conflicted with federal law.87 In the second case, Brinkman v. 
Rahm, the Ninth Circuit struck down Washington State's pro-
cedure for deducting payments from involuntarily hospitalized 
reaching of Social Security benefits is not going to impair the ability of the recipi-
ent to satisfy his or her basic needs.") with Davis, 616 F.2d at 830-32 (exception 
applies if a state provides all of the care and maintenance for a Social Security 
beneficiary). 
80. 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1995). 
81. Id. at 1165. 
82. Id. at 1167. 
83. Id. at 1165-67. 
84. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67. See supra note 28 for full text of statute. 
85. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165; U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
86. Crawford. 56 F.3d at 1165-67 (citing Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 
(1988) and Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1989». 
87. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397-98. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that, under 
Bennett, no implied exception exists to the SSANP allowing attachment simply 
because the state provides the recipient with all of his needed care and mainte-
nance. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165 (citing Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397). 
13
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patients' hospital accounts.ss In Brinkman, the Washington 
patients' accounts contained deposited Social Security bene-
fits. 89 The Ninth Circuit held that the SSANP's language pro-
tecting Social Security benefits from legal process preempted 
the Washington procedure and struck down the Washington 
statute.90 
Comparing California's procedure to Washington's, as 
analyzed in Brinkman, the Ninth Circuit focused on the simi-
larity of the two states' practices.91 For example, like Wash-
ington, California withdraws money from involuntarily institu-
tionalized patients' hospital accounts to pay for the costs of 
their care.92 This money includes patients' Social Security 
benefits.93 In Crawford, California argued that its procedure 
was distinguishable because it asked patients to sign an "Au-
thorization for Deposit and Withdrawal" before withdrawing 
any funds, whereas Washington merely gave notice before 
deducting Social Security funds.94 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this distinction for two rea-
sons.95 First, California did not inform patients of their option 
to refuse to apply Social Security benefits to pay for care 
costS.96 Next, California deducted patients' Social Security 
funds even if the patients had not signed the "Authorization 
for Deposit and Withdrawal" form.97 As a result, the Washing-
ton and California procedures were substantively the same in 
that both deducted funds from patients' accounts after provid-
88. Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263, 264 (9th Cir. 1989). Involuntarily com-
mitted patients in the state of Washington were held responsible for their care 
costs. The state withdrew funds from patients hospital accounts, which included 
Social Security benefits, to pay for these costs of care. A Washington state form 
entitled "Notice and Finding of Responsibility" set forth patients' liability and ex-
plained that it would apply Social Security benefits to their care costs. Crawford, 
56 F.3d at 1165 (citing Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264). 
89. [d. at 1165-66 (citing Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264). 
90. Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 263 (relying on Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 
(1988) (per curiam)). 
91. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-66. 
92. [d. at 1165. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. at 1165-66. 
95. [d. at 1166. 
96. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166. 
97. [d. 
14
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ing minimal notice and without obtaining patients' meaningful 
consent.98 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the similarities 
between the Washington and California procedures meant that 
California's procedures were inconsistent with, and thus pre-
empted by, the SSANP.99 
California also argued that the Washington case alone was 
not dispositive regarding preemption. loo As a result, Califor-
nia insisted that the Ninth Circuit was required to apply the 
Brinkman preemption analysis to the Crawford facts. 101 
Quoting Bennett, the court held that "[the SSANP] rules out 
any attempt to attach Social Security benefits", even when the 
benefits would be used to pay the costs of caring for an institu-
tionalized individuap02 Washington's procedures fell into the 
category of "other legal process" specifically prohibited by the 
SSANP. 103 This led the court's conclusion that since 
California's procedures were comparable, they likewise consti-
tuted "other legal process."l04 Thus, regardless of Brinkman, 
the SSANP's language protecting benefits from "other legal 
process" would require invalidation of California's proce-
dure. l05 
The State argued that, since it never threatened to use 
judicial process to collect Social Security benefits, it could not 
have violated the SSANP's protection against "other legal pro-
cess.,,106 California attempted to distinguish itself from the 
Washington procedure which threatened patients with judicial 
98. Id. 
99. Id. See Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 263, for an in-depth explanation of the 
Washington State procedure. 





105. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166. 
106. Id. The inconsistency between the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), and 
California's procedure arises from § 407's language which exempts Social Security 
benefits from "other legal process." Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th 
Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit held in Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 263 that 
Washington's procedure was in conflict with the "other legal process" language. 
Because California's procedure was similar to Washington's, the Ninth Circuit also 
found it in conflict with the "other legal process" language. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 
1165-66. 
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proceedings if their debts were not paid.107 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected this argument, holding that judicial proceedings were 
not the only sort of legal process prohibited by the SSANP.108 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that California's practice of with-
drawing Social Security benefits from patients' accounts with-
out consent was within the meaning of "other legal pro-
cess.,,109 In addition, the court found that Congress intended 
the SSANP to "protect Social Security beneficiaries and their 
dependents from the claims of creditors."l1o Thus, the court, 
consistent with Congressional intent, found California's proce-
dure in conflict with the SSANP's "other legal process" lan-
guage. 111 
Finally, California argued that Brinkman does not require 
the state to obtain consent prior to deducting Social Security 
benefits.112 Rather, the state need only provide patients with 
notice of the deductions made. 113 However, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected this argument on two grounds. 114 First, the court 
pointed out that it had enjoined Washington from seizing the 
plaintiffs' Social Security funds in Brinkman. 115 The injunc-
tion necessarily suggested that a state could not deduct Social 
Security benefits even after giving patients notice. 11s Next, 
the court pointed out that California's argument was incon-
107. [d. at 1166. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. 
110. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166 (quoting from Fetterusso v. New York, 898 F.2d 
322, 327 (2nd Cir. 1990». The Ninth Circuit also distinguished Fetterusso, which 
upheld a New York state process of deducting costs for care from involuntarily 
institutionalized patient accounts which contained Social Security benefits. The 
cases would be distinguished, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, because the finding in 
Fetterusso was that patients had voluntarily agreed to use Social Security benefits 
to pay for the cost of their care. This was demonstrably different from Crawford 
in which plaintiffs had clearly shown they did not consent to the California pro-
cedure. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166-67. 
111. [d. at 1166. 
112. [d. at 1167. 
113. [d. The basis of this argument was the relief ordered in Brinkman. In 
Brinkman, the Ninth Circuit ordered the State of Washington "to provide notice to 
the plaintiffs of defendants' seizure of their funds, adequate notice of any exemp-
tions . . . and adequate notice of how to exercise those exemptions." Crawford, 56 
F.3d at 1167 (quoting Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 266). 
114. [d. 
115. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1167. 
116. [d. 
16
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sistent with the court's holding in Brinkman that the SSANP 
preempted Washington's administrative process. ll7 The Ninth 
Circuit found California's argument unpersuasive due to these 
oversights. 118 
In concluding its analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted that it 
had not evaluated the wisdom of exempting Social Security 
benefits from payment for services when a state provides a 
beneficiary with care and maintenance. 119 Rather, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that it merely followed the Supreme Court's 
holding in Bennett and the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Congressional intent regarding the SSANP.120 
B. CONCURRENCE 
Judge Trott agreed with the majority's analysis and con-
clusion that the SSANP preempted California's process, apply-
ing the holdings of Bennett and Brinkman. 121 However, in a 
concurring opinion, he argued that the end result of the hold-
ing seemed "nonsensical" from a policy point of view. 122 
To illustrate this conclusion, Judge Trott pointed out that 
under this holding, while a state provides for a hospitalized 
patient's necessities, it cannot obtain reimbursement from the 
patient's funds if he or she resists. 123 Judge Trott concluded 
"Thus, a recalcitrant patient receiving Social Security pay-
ments could pile up in about ten years an untouchable bank 
117. [d. 
118. See id. 
119. [d. 
120. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1167-68. See generally IB JEREMY C. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE en 0.401-0.403 (2d ed. 1985) (stare decisis); Powell, 
Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281 (1990); Strauss, 
Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699 (1991); Traynor, 
Limits of Judicial Creativity, 29 HAsTINGS L.J. 1025 (1978). 
121. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1995). The concurrence 
stated that "[ulnder these circumstances, permitting the state to say, as it does, 
that taking money from people who don't want to give it up is not 'legal process' 
sounds too much like a construction out of Bleak House, or the parchment stuff 
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account of $250,000 while requiring taxpayers to foot the bill 
for the costs of his hospitalization."124 
While Judge Trott thought that California's desire to ob-
tain reimbursement from these patients may be "palatable," he 
objected to the state's procedure to achieve this end.125 The 
concurrence instead suggested that California should seek its 
remedy through Congress, not the courts. 126 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit outlined a clear approach to resolving 
conflicts between a state procedure taking Social Security 
benefits and the SSANP.127 According to Crawford, "Absent 
consent, a state has no valid means of obtaining an institution-
alized person's Social Security benefits."128 The Ninth Circuit 
adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning that the SSANP 
"unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social Securi-
ty benefits."129 
Two aspects of the holding in Crawford merit analysis. As 
Judge Trott recognized, applying the holding can cause situa-
tions that appear "nonsensical.,,13o In addition, the Ninth 
Circuit's holding in Crawford contrasts with the Eleventh 
Circuit's holding in Watkins. l3l 
A. JunGE TROTT'S HYPOTHETICAL PATIENT 
To support his opinion, Judge Trott created a hypothetical 
patient who could "pile up" an untouchable $250,000 in bene-
fits while institutionalized. 132 Situations similar to Judge 
Trott's hypothetical have been adjudicated with similar re-
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169. 
127. See Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1995). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 1165 (citing Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397). 
130. Id. at 1169. 
131. See generally Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165; Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. 
132. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169. 
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sultS.133 For example, case law constrains the State of Mis-
souri from threatening insanity acquittees' representative 
payees with legal action to reach Social Security benefits. 134 
The State attempted to reach these benefits to pay for the 
acquittees' care. 135 In New York, the State may not use court 
proceedings to force insanity acquittees' representative payees 
to use the acquittees' Social Security funds for care costs. 136 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court restricted Ar-
kansas from taking Social Security benefits from prisoners to 
pay for the costs of incarceration. 137 
Regarding California's procedure, Judge Trott admitted 
that the justification for "permitting a patient to "pile up ... 
an untouchable bank account ... while requiring taxpayers to 
foot the bill" escaped him, being that it "hardly seems consis-
tent with the purpose of the Social Security Act."138 By stat-
ing that "[ w]e do not determine the wisdom of exempting So-
cial Security benefits from legal process when the state provid-
ed the beneficiary with care and maintenance,"139 the majori-
ty opinion indicated that the panel chose not to analyze the po-
tential results of its ruling.140 The Ninth Circuit distanced 
itself from the logic of its result by holding that it was "con-
strained to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of Con-
gressional intent with respect to [the SSANp].,,14l 
The Ninth Circuit strictly applied the language and hold-
ing of Bennett rather than shaping its own implied exception to 
133. See, e.g., King v. Schafer, 940 F.2d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that the term "other legal process" includes threat of legal process, and thus 
state's action was in violation of § 407) cert. denied 502 U.S. 1095 (1991); 
Kreigbaum v. Katz, 909 F.2d 70, 71, 74 (2nd Cir. 1991) (acquittees' payees, who 
had amassed Social Security payments of $48,776.33 and $18,114.86, could not be 
forced by special proceeding available under New York law to pay these funds 
towards recipients' care costs). 
134. See Schafer, 940 F.2d at 1185 (the term "other legal process" includes 
threat of legal process, and thus state's act of threatening to bring legal action 
was in violation of § 407). 
135. [d. 
136. See Katz, 909 F.2d at 71, 74. 
137. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1988) (per curiam). 
138. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169. 
139. [d. at 1167. 
140. See id. 
141. [d. at 1167-68. 
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the SSANP, as the Eleventh Circuit had done. 142 Crawford's 
holding does not include an implied exception despite the fact 
that an exception might prevent some of these "nonsensical" 
results. l43 Applying the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Watkins 
to Judge Trott's hypothetical demonstrates that the results 
would be quite different. 144 
Watkins implies an exception to the SSANP if a state, by 
reaching Social Security benefits, does not impair the ability of 
the recipient to satisfy his or her basic needs. l45 Judge Trott's 
hypothetical has a patient earning as much as $250,000 over 
ten years of institutionalization. l46 Under the Eleventh Cir-
cuit approach, the state could gain access to a large portion of 
these funds to cover a recipient's care costs since such a large 
amount of money is more than enough to satisfy a recipient's 
basic needs. 147 This approach to SSANP law does not appear 
to conflict with the Social Security system's purpose of protect-
ing a worker and his family from 10SS.I46 Under the Eleventh 
Circuit approach, institutionalized patients could not accumu-
late massive funds in untouchable bank accounts, thereby 
forcing taxpayers to pay for their care. 149 
142. Id. at 1167. Compare Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-68 (following reasoning of 
Bennett, that the SSANP unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social 
Security benefits) with Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180 (11th Circuit has an implied excep-
tion to the SSANP). 
143. See Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169. ("nonsensical" refers to Judge Trott's con-
currence when he points out that a patient could acquire an untouchable bank 
account of $250,000 while requiring taxpayers to pay the bill for his or her care). 
Compare Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169 with Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192, (attempted 
protection of funds by recipient millionaire termed "almost ridiculous," and § 407 
thus not applied). 
144. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192; see also notes 67-75 and accompanying 
text. 
145. Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. 
146. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169. 
147. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. Compare rule of Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192 
(Eleventh Circuit has an implied exception to § 407 when reaching of Social Secu-
rity benefits will not impair ability of recipient to satisfy basic needs) with 
Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169 (Judge Trott's hypothetical patient). 
148. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. 
149. Id. See also Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169. 
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B. THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE NINTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS 
In a case unrelated to SSANP law, Judge Trott gave an 
example of the effect of a split between the circuits. l50 In that 
case, the Ninth Circuit attempted to interpret the Congressio-
nal intent for a statute which several Circuits had interpreted 
inconsistently.151 In referring to the several splits, Trott said: 
Imagine what we would say if Congress had 
enacted this law: Eligibility for 121(c) relief 
ceases (1) in Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Indi-
ana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, when a deportation 
order becomes administratively final; (2) in Ala-
bama, Florida, and Georgia, when the order to 
show cause is issued; (3) in Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern 
Mariana Islands, when the Board may no longer 
reconsider or reopen the case; (4) in Connecticut, 
New York and Vermont, under a rule which is 
different from the rule in Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Texas, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin but not 
clearly stated; and (5) elsewhere, depending on 
the option chosen by the judges of the U.S. 
Courts of Appeal. 152 
Uniform application of federal law across geographic and 
circuit boundaries is essential. 153 Fortunately, the functional-
ity of our judicial system allows one Supreme Court to clarify a 
statute which has been interpreted inconsistently among the 
150. See Nairn Butros v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 
990 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1993) (Trott, J., dissenting). 
151. Id. at 1144-46. 
152. Id. at 1152. 
153. Id. at 1149. 
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circuits. 1M However, this purpose cannot be served if, after 
the Supreme Court rules, circuits independently find excep-
tions to interpreted statutes. 155 
One of the important purposes for the Supreme Court 
having supreme power over federal law is to establish a sole 
interpreter and decision-maker whose holdings provide unifor-
mity throughout the states.1S6 Whether the Supreme Court is 
correct in its interpretation of a law or of Congressional intent 
is irrelevant.157 As Supreme Court Justice Jackson eloquently 
said, "[t]here is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme 
Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals . . . would also 
be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we 
are infallible only because we are final.,,158 
Interpreting the SSANP, the Supreme Court has spoken 
clearly.159 The SSANP "unambiguously rules out any attempt 
to attach Social Security benefits."16o The Supreme Court also 
defined Congressional intent in enacting the SSANP, stating 
154. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III §§ 1, 2 ("The judicial power of the Unit-
ed States shall be vested in one [S]upreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."); U.S. CONST. art. VI 
("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judg-
es in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.") 
155. See, e.g., Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192, and Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67, 
demonstrating the current split between the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits regarding 
42 U.S.C. § 407(a). Had the Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning of Bennett, as 
the Ninth Circuit did, no such split would exist. 
156. See generally McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobac-
co, 496 U.S. 18, 28-29 (1989) ("To secure state-court compliance with and national 
uniformity of federal law, the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over cases 
encompassing issues of federal law is subject to two conditions: state courts must 
interpret and enforce faithfully the 'supreme law of the land', and their decisions 
are subject to review by this court."); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 
(1983) (" . . . [I]t cannot be doubted that there is an important need for uniformi-
ty in federal law .... "); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 541 (1953) (Jackson, J. 
concurring) ("Since the Constitution and laws made pursuant to it create the su-
preme law and since the supremacy and uniformity of federal law are attainable 
only by a centralized source of authority, denial by a state of a claimed right 
must give some access to the federal judicial system."). 
157. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 540. 
158. Id. 
159. See Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397. 
160. [d. 
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that it was "the clear intent of Congress that Social Security 
benefits not be attachable."161 In Bennett, the Supreme Court 
exercised its supreme power and elucidated Congressional 
intent for the SSANP.162 While the Eleventh Circuit's holding 
does not directly conflict with the Supreme Court's language in 
Bennett, it seems at odds with Bennett's holding and reason-
ing.163 The Ninth Circuit's approach, on the other hand, fol-
lows Bennett's holding and reasoning exactly.l64 
Judge Trott's concurrence explained the proper remedy to 
California's situation:165 California should seek its remedy in 
Congress, not the courts; i.e., a judicially created implied ex-
ception approach is inappropriate. l66 Congress must create its 
policy when passing law and ultimately Congress must decide 
whether Judge Trott's hypothetical causes a nonsensical 
result. 167 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Crawford v. Gould, the Ninth Circuit followed the Su-
preme Court precedent in Bennett. 16B The Ninth Circuit held 
that the SSANP unambiguously bars any attempt by a state to 
take a recipient's Social Security benefits without his or her 
consent. 169 This holding rejected the proposition that an "im-
plied exception" to the SSANP exists when a state provides for 
all of a recipient's care and maintenance. 170 
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Citronelle-Mobile Gather-
161. [d. at 398. 
162. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 398. 
163. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. Compare Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1191-92 
(11th circuit implies an exception to the SSANP) with Bennett, 485 U.S. 396-98 
(SSANP unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social Security benefits) 
and Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-68. 
164. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-68. 
165. [d. at 1169. 
166. [d. 
167. See id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, ("All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . "). 
168. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1165-68 (9th Cir. 1995). 
169. [d. at 1167. 
170. [d. at 1165. Compare Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397 (1988) with 
Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67. 
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ing v. Watkins did not follow the reasoning of Bennett.17l 
Thus, there is a clear split between the Ninth and the Elev-
enth Circuits on the question of whether an "implied excep-
tion" to the SSANP exists. 172 
The Ninth Circuit found that patients who challenged 
California's procedure have a federal statutory right to refuse 
to allow their Social Security benefits to be used to pay for the 
costs of their care. 173 Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, unless Con-
gress acts to clarify its purpose with the SSANP, these pa-
tients will conceivably be able to "pile up" large amounts of 
money without having to pay for the costs of their care. 174 
Paul Webb" 
171. See Citronelle·Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 56 F.3d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir. 
1991). Compare Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1191-92 (using implied exception approach to 
the SSANP) with Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397-98. 
172. Compare Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67 with Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1191-92. 
173. See Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67. 
174. Id. at 1169. The Ninth Circuit did not address other possible procedures of 
obtaining payment from the plaintiff patients. See generally King v. Schafer, 940 
F.2d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir. 1991) (department of Mental Health's application to 
serve as patients' representative payee is not "other legal process" as defined by § 
407(a)); Kreigbaum v. Katz, 909 F.2d 70, 71, 74 (2nd Cir. 1990) (holding that 
under 20 C.F.R. § 404.2050 the Social Security Administration alone has the pow-
er to appoint a new representative payee if the current payee does not use pay-
ments on beneficiary's behalf); Woodall v. Bartolino, 700 F.Supp. 210, 216-21 
(D.N.J. 1985) (stating that failure of a representative payee to apply funds to the 
costs of care and maintenance of an institutionalized individual may result in 
removing the representative payee and, perhaps, naming as payee the institution 
caring for the patient); see also Matter of Vary's Estate, 258 N.W. 2d 11, 17-19 
(1977) (protection of § 407 ends at recipient's death). 
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